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Abstract 
The paper proposes to expand the constructivist view from empirical analysis to 
pragmatic advice. Its main thesis is: The fact that methods and concepts in the pro-
duction of knowledge and standards for justifying truth claims are culturally bound 
does not preclude these bonds from being observed and also controlled and ad-
justed. Knowledge work imports scientific methods and concepts into virtually all 
segments of society. Whether knowledge is well manufactured and trustworthy is 
no longer the sole concern of scientific communities but of clients, stakeholder 
groups, political bodies, and other actors. The paper begins with reconsidering the 
symmetry principle of the ‘Strong Programme’ from a methodological point of 
view. It argues that excluding justified beliefs from the realm of independent vari-
ables is unwarranted. Even if it is impossible to introduce truth as a cause, it is pos-
sible to accept justifications of beliefs as causes. In a second line of analysis, this 
paper explores that the concept of cultural relativity of knowledge has an internal 
instability. Every lesson in cultural relativism is a lesson in designing cognitive 
strategies to transcend it. The better the social construction of scientific knowledge 
is understood and even causally explained, the better reflexive abstraction opens up 
possibilities to operate with this causality and loosen or tighten the cultural bonds. 
Examples demonstrate that crossing established boundaries and aiming at higher 
degrees of cultural independency are as meaningful as value based restrictions to 
smaller domains. It is in this context that constructivism has a future as a frame for 
deliberative forms of knowledge construction and justification. 
                                                             
1 I wish to thank the journal’s two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments, Kai Buchholz, 
Justus Lentsch, and Malte Schopphaus for a fruitful discussion, and Peter Lenco for his at-
tempt to put my German thought style in English words. The paper was written in my Eng-
lish idiom, which Peter tried to remediate. The remaining deficits are my fault. Peter also 
suggested substantial improvements which I tried to adopt. 
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1 Introduction: ‘Good’ and 
‘Bad’ Constructions 
This paper aims at recovering a norma-
tive stance for the social studies of sci-
ence which were lost through the con-
structivist approach. The principal 
question is rather simple: How can we, 
as scientific observers of scientific en-
terprises, distinguish between good 
and bad constructions of knowledge? 
Of course, this question presupposes 
that we should do so. Nevertheless, we 
should be aware of the conceptual 
problems involved in contaminating 
the empirical sociological analysis with 
normative claims. There is no easy re-
turn to any Mertonian position that 
would declare as more or less self-
evident the effectiveness of a set of in-
stitutional rules directing scientific 
practices toward true and valuable 
knowledge. On the other hand, it 
seems odd that those who have been so 
successful in reconstructing the social 
framework in which knowledge claims 
and trust in knowledge are constituted 
declare themselves unable to pro-
nounce any judgement with respect to 
the acceptability of such knowledge. 
The counter intuition is that the careful 
observation of anything made and used 
by human beings enables us to evalu-
ate its quality and reliability insofar as 
the observer has turned into an expert. 
Usually, expert opinion somehow 
combines the knowable and the valu-
able either in careful if-then clauses or 
by blending ‘is’ and ‘ought’. I would 
advocate such a professional expert 
position that is based on social studies 
of scientific knowledge construction 
and that aims at giving advice in the 
context of knowledge society. How-
ever, this paper’s concern is to deal 
with conceptual and methodological 
problems raised by the attempt to con-
join normative and descriptive aspects 
of knowledge analysis.  
The normative shift from not only ask-
ing why certain constructions of 
knowledge are actually accepted in cer-
tain social settings but also claiming to 
determine the conditions of acceptabil-
ity is induced by the following motif. 
Knowledge production and its applica-
tion become increasingly intercon-
nected in recursive dynamics of social 
change. There are already different 
models constructed to understand this 
new institutional arrangement. These 
include – presumably among others – 
the mode II model (Gibbons et.al. 
1994; Nowotny et. al. 2001, dt. 2004); 
the co-production of science and soci-
ety (Jasonoff 2004); the variants of ac-
tor-network models (Latour 2005); 
and the real world experimentation 
approach (Groß/Hoffmann-Riem/Krohn 
2005). These models raise new ques-
tions concerning the legitimacy and re-
sponsibility of scientific work embed-
ded in non-scientific enterprises. But 
they are – with the exception of the last 
one – reluctant to suggest answers. 
The self-reflexive question is: given the 
competence in the empirical analysis of 
new arrangements of knowledge pro-
duction in knowledge societies, what 
follows with respect to critically evalu-
ating the appropriate set-up of such 
arrangements? Take as an example 
regulatory experiments concerning the 
deliberate release of GMOs as defined 
by the Genetic Engineering Act and EC 
Directive 90/219/EEC.2 Are the de-
sign, responsibility distribution, and 
involvement of actors in a well ordered 
state? Science researchers are pre-
sumably not well equipped with a cog-
nitive and institutional repertoire suit-
able to giving advice in these matters. 
And if asked – luckily we are not – how 
                                                             
2 The responsible agency in Germany is the 
Robert Koch-Institute in cooperation with 
the Federal Environmental Agency (Federal 
Ministry of Environment), Federal Biologi-
cal Research Centre for Agriculture and 
Forestry ( Federal Ministry of Consumer 
Protection, Food and Agriculture) and the 
Federal Research Centre for Virus Diseases 
of Animals (in cases of using genetically 
modified vertebrates or genetically modi-
fied micro-organisms that are applied to 
vertebrates; Federal Ministry of Health). 
Information from http://www.oecd.org/-
document/30/0. 
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in these matters a social construction 
of knowledge production should be ar-
ranged according to the findings of 
past observations, the sociological ob-
server would politely insist on being 
nothing else than a careful observer. 
Admittedly, social scientists would 
overstress their status if they planned 
to gain power in defining the correct 
institutions and procedures of co-
production, experimental recursive 
learning, and robust research. On the 
other hand, it would seem odd if in 
matters of legitimacy, reliability, fair-
ness, and efficiency of knowledge pro-
duction everybody had something to 
say except for the sociologists of sci-
ence whose professional self-
understanding restricted them to ob-
serve, but not to shape, knowledge 
production.  
The stance taken in this paper is differ-
ent. The focal point is that precisely 
because constructivism has theoreti-
cally, methodologically, and empiri-
cally invalidated (almost) all claims of 
unconditioned universal and objective 
knowledge, and just because it has dis-
closed the dependence of acceptance 
criteria on interests, prejudices, status, 
values, and world views, it enables us 
to critically correct this kind of de-
pendence. From a philosophical point 
of view, one could say that empirical 
observations of such relations between 
knowledge and context tend to be gen-
eralized to a universal relativism. From 
a pragmatic point of view, they con-
tribute to a toolkit which can help to 
construct more or less objective and 
universal knowledge claims. Both 
strategies – on the one hand to gener-
alize and objectify knowledge, on the 
other to bind its scope and validity to 
cultural locales - have their merits and 
costs. Deliberative constructivism is 
about understanding and making use 
of these strategies. The main thesis to 
be developed and justified in the fol-
lowing is: precisely because our meth-
ods and concepts in the production of 
knowledge and the justification of 
truth claims are culture bound, their 
relatedness can not only be observed 
but also controlled and adjusted – at 
least to some degree. To speak of 
grades is important here. Rendering 
some knowledge more or less general 
or objective does not presuppose a be-
lief in (the possibility of) universal and 
objective knowledge. A physicist can 
speak of degrees of power without nec-
essarily believing in the existence of 
something theoretical, such as total or 
absolute power. 
The controversy about truth relativism 
is, of course, as old as the philosophy 
of knowledge, which was born in the 
Sophist period of Greek philosophy. Its 
most important later stages are the 
medieval disputes between the Church 
and deviating scholars on the double 
standard of revealed versus discovered 
truths; the Baconian analysis of the 
idols which prevented people of his 
time from accepting the experimental 
method; and the sociology of knowl-
edge tearing down the Cartesian 
dogma of autonomous rationality. It 
has been the merit of the social con-
structivist programme to carry the con-
troversy fully into the system of science 
and fuel it by empirical research. The 
more ‘scientific’ the cases to be studied 
appeared to be, the more far reaching 
were the consequences of the lesson 
about the social conditioning of the 
content and justification of knowledge. 
However, the prevailing discourse on 
the role of science in knowledge society 
makes it necessary to equally empha-
size the reversed perspective. Knowl-
edge work imports scientific methods 
and concepts into virtually all seg-
ments of society. Whether knowledge 
is well manufactured and trustworthy 
is no longer the concern of scientific 
communities but of clients, organiza-
tions, associations, stakeholder groups, 
political bodies, and other actors. Con-
troversies between scientific experts 
and counter experts can only be heated 
but not solved by demonstrating the 
relatedness of knowledge to interests 
and money. Thus it would seem that 
even commissioned knowledge work is 
not worth its money if its product can-
not be put to proof and test. This im-
44 STI Studies, Special Issue 1, 2006: 41-60 
 
plies that knowledge society is in need 
of that kind of toolkit that gives scien-
tific and science-based knowledge its 
internal truth value – be this value re-
lated to other values, norms, and inter-
ests or not. If Luhmann is right in say-
ing that the predominance of knowl-
edge over norms in society is indicated 
by the acceptance of a cognitive style of 
learning at the cost of a normative style 
of cultivating traditions (Luhmann 
1990: 138), then understanding the 
modalities of the social construction of 
knowledge becomes a project of socie-
tal relevance. Willingness to learn de-
pends on the readiness to accept the 
‘truth’ of a lesson to be learned. Truth 
in this context means to impute the 
cause of knowledge to the environment 
of learning, not to the action of learn-
ing. At variance to learning through 
teachers, science is specialized in 
learning something new which no 
other agency can know better. Usually 
nothing other than scientific agencies 
can control truth claims insofar as they 
are based on scientific learning (even if 
in certain cases local experience beats 
scientific expertise). In consequence, 
knowledge society becomes increas-
ingly dependent on trust in knowledge 
and its agents. This dependency is 
counterbalanced, at least partially, by 
additional measures for the control of 
truth claims which can prevent trust 
investors from losses of capital, politi-
cal credibility, health or even aspira-
tions. Liability action can be a harder 
threat than the displeasure of admit-
ting to colleagues an error or failure.  
I return at the end of the paper (sec-
tion 5) to this relation between stan-
dards of justification and kinds of 
knowledge claims. The next section is 
purely methodological and tries to de-
velop a framework that allows for the 
relation between sociological and epis-
temological references. 
 
 
2 The Veil of Methodological 
Ignorance 
I will start with making a strong meth-
odological argument for the social con-
structivist symmetry principle as it was 
announced in David Bloor’s classic 
“Science and Social Imagery” (1976). I 
plan to go beyond it, but nevertheless it 
is a point of departure to be taken seri-
ously. The symmetry principle states 
that for the sociological explanation of 
why some knowledge is socially ac-
cepted, its quality of being true or false 
is irrelevant. I want to throw some 
light on the principle by considering it 
in a metaphorical setting, one that has 
been used quite often in giving expres-
sion to the human condition: reality as 
a maze or a labyrinth. The labyrinth 
metaphor encapsulates the complexity 
of the world and the experiences of 
confusion and delusion encountered by 
those who got lost in it. Real world 
labyrinths have been constructed for 
all kinds of exercises. These include the 
ingenious invention of Ariadne when 
she rescued Theseus at the Knosses 
palace labyrinth; the model for salva-
tion given to Christian visitors of ca-
thedral labyrinths; amusement for 
court people in maze gardens; and the 
observation of rats in laboratory mazes 
(see Methews 1922, Attali 1999). The 
allegorical labyrinth is the metaphor 
for the world itself in which we are in-
cluded. Hope does not lie in escape, 
but in orientation by solving the riddle 
of its construction. Whether it is of a 
Platonic order which can be discovered 
by trial and error, modelling, and cal-
culation, or whether it is determined 
by a Democritean mess that allows at 
best some temporal and local solu-
tions, we are never able to decide.  
I take up this metaphor in order to 
construct a thought experiment which 
can shed light on the connection be-
tween methodology and observation in 
the sociology of science. Let us imagine 
any simple spatial labyrinth into which 
at least two actors are thrown – in the 
sense of Heidegger’s Geworfenheit - 
and experience their being in the laby-
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rinth. Step by step they transform their 
experiences into pieces of knowledge 
and patterns of orientation. They 
communicate plans, act by trial and 
error, interpret outcomes and develop 
descriptive models. Each can trust and 
distrust the information the other of-
fers; believe and doubt their theories. 
By and large they generate a common 
stock of conventional knowledge which 
they trust even if they are puzzled by 
surprises. Incentives to act as re-
searchers can easily be added.  
How can one know what they are do-
ing? In our thought experiment they 
are observed by a sociologist who spe-
cializes in doing research on how re-
searchers expand their knowledge 
base. He or she reports the knowledge 
he gains to other observers of observ-
ers, who can trust or distrust the in-
formation. Granted, the scenario is 
oversimplified and could be enriched 
in every direction (e.g. different groups 
of competitive actors, division of la-
bour, different languages causing 
translation problems), but it is rich 
enough to pursue a fundamental epis-
temological question, namely, where 
do we locate the sociological observer, 
i.e. the secondary observer? The choice 
is simple: inside or outside the laby-
rinth. But the consequences are con-
siderable. If located outside, the sec-
ondary observer is in the comfortable 
position to evaluate progress and error 
of the primary observers or actors. If 
located inside, the secondary observer 
is no better condition than the actors. 
In fact he knows even less, since he is 
not involved in the business of discov-
ery, even though he may perhaps con-
tribute other benefits such as keeping 
records, checking for consistency, or 
writing down history. In sum: to posi-
tion the secondary observer inside the 
labyrinth makes him a cultural relativ-
ist doomed to accept the symmetry 
principle. If the secondary observer is 
located outside the labyrinth, his posi-
tion is a realist one. Being in the posi-
tion to overview the labyrinth he can 
determine the degree of correctness of 
knowledge and evaluate the reasoning 
of the actors and can even observe 
what in the actors’ environment makes 
successful learning easy or difficult. 
The best approximation to this realist 
position is the one of a teacher, who, 
furnished with superior knowledge, 
trains students. An approximation to a 
relativist position is a lay person ob-
serving experts in the process of prob-
lem solving, e.g. finding the cause of a 
malfunctioning machine, or the ade-
quate diagnosis of a disease. In such 
cases the lay person cannot have any 
justified belief closer to the solution 
than the experts.   
On what grounds can we base the deci-
sion between the alternative options of 
locating the secondary observer? Al-
ready in asking the question we are in-
volved in constructing another frame 
of reference, in which we locate an ob-
server of higher order—a third order 
observer—who reflects upon the pros 
and cons of locating the second order 
observer inside or outside the laby-
rinth. Surely the third order observer 
would consider whether the second or-
der observer actually has access to 
knowledge about the labyrinth inde-
pendent from the primary observers’ 
reports. At this level of analysis, in 
which the observation of observers 
plays a role, methodological controver-
sies within scientific disciplines have 
their place. Methodology in the hu-
manities and social sciences is a matter 
of third order observation. Before look-
ing at some examples it should be 
mentioned that further iteration leads 
into undecidable philosophical issues. 
The issues which the observer of the 
fourth order can raise concern the 
question as to whether the third order 
observer has any access to a reality at 
all, or whether he is doomed to exist in 
an eternally unknown environment. 
Since this concern no longer relates to 
questions of method, it surpasses the 
scope of this paper. It may be empha-
sized, though, that philosophies of 
relativism as well as realism, in trying 
to address this highest level of reflec-
tion, loose relevance with respect to 
deciding the question of where an ob-
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server of observers should locate him-
self.3 
Returning to this question it may be 
interesting to briefly illustrate it with 
examples taken from fields of the hu-
manities, social sciences, and biology. I 
apologize for giving these examples 
more or less freehand; they are not 
based on an analysis of the present 
state of methodological discourse. In 
all fields we meet long-lasting meth-
odological controversies with charac-
teristic dividing lines. Some of these 
relate directly to the place provided for 
the secondary or scientific observer.  
Ethnography and Social Anthropol-
ogy have always been divided on the 
question of how rigorously they should 
accept the complete ‘strangeness’ of 
other cultures. Taken as completely 
alien, the culture to be studied is an 
unknown labyrinth with unknown ac-
tors. The ethnographer as secondary 
observer locates himself inside, willing 
to learn the language and understand 
the institutions without knowing in ad-
vance whether they can be compared 
with anything he is acquainted with. 
Quite different is the functionalistic 
approach. Its most outspoken propo-
nent was Bronislaw Malinowski. He 
clearly positioned himself outside the 
labyrinth. He believed in a general 
functionalistic theory of culture which 
allows a bird’s-eye perspective. Differ-
ent cultures are “manifestations” of a 
general schema (Malinowski 1975: 74). 
Looking from this scientific point of 
view he believed to possess a theoreti-
cal device with which he could decode 
                                                             
3 This statement does not imply the use-
lessness of philosophical discourse. The 
differences between, say, a phenomenol-
ogical theory, which embeds knowledge in 
our being present in a world which we do 
not infer but live with, and a Kantian ap-
proach where the world is given as a mani-
fold variety of perceptive impressions from 
which everything is imagined, are pertinent 
for a general theory of knowledge. But they 
are not helpful for a discourse on the dif-
ferent options for framing the observation 
of observers.   
and thereby understand the basic de-
sign of the labyrinth even better than 
the actors inside. Malinowski would 
admit, of course, that understanding 
the specifics of institutions is only pos-
sible by deeply immersing oneself into 
the unknown details. But in principle 
the situation does not seem to be com-
pletely different from research in fields 
such as astronomy, biology, or geology 
where all objects differ merely in de-
tail. Malinowski’s decoding device pro-
vided by a general theory of culture is 
almost like an algorithm for solving 
any labyrinth. Just the opposite strat-
egy is adopted by those who believe in 
the relevance of fundamental differ-
ences between all cultures. As scientific 
observers, they do not want to get 
completely lost in the labyrinth of an 
observed culture. This is because it 
would mean losing one’s scientific atti-
tude and becoming socialized as a new 
member of the culture under study 
with fading memories to one’s original 
culture. Instead, one has to face the 
translation problem between two cul-
tures. The ethnologist is an observant 
actor there and a trustworthy reporter 
here, although moving between both 
positions he has to master the transla-
tion problem. Translation can be de-
fined as the attempt to relate observa-
tions made inside one labyrinth to 
those existing in another. From a cul-
tural relativist point of view, the cor-
rectness of the translation cannot be 
examined.  
Historians face a different problem. By 
definition, there is no way to become 
part of an earlier culture because it is 
gone. In attempting to do so the re-
searcher would only meet his fellow 
scientists, also studying texts and ma-
terial remains. Since the so-called his-
toricism controversy, the focal meth-
odological problem of the discipline 
has been, however, whether the histo-
rian should try to virtually localize 
himself in the presence of the past, i.e. 
make efforts to observe as if nothing is 
known to him or her about the future 
path of development. In doing so the 
historian would try to assimilate to 
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someone invented or at least recon-
structed by his discipline – the ideal 
medieval monk or medieval heretic, an 
early industrial entrepreneur or prole-
tarian, etc. The paradoxical situation 
is: historians invent the labyrinths in 
which they want to get lost in order to 
test their inventions. Historians also 
face the translation problem which 
may be even more severe because the 
continuity of the languages suggest 
similarities of meaning which may be 
misleading.  
Cognition research is my third exam-
ple. It comprises the biological, psy-
chological, and artificial fields which 
are all very close to the labyrinth sce-
nario. It was Humberto Maturana, in 
his quarrel with the artificial intelli-
gence research of the 1950s, who tried 
to develop a methodology that places 
the observer inside the labyrinth. The 
idea was to reconstruct the operations 
of a cognition system completely from 
the internal perspective of such a sys-
tem, one that is absolutely unable to 
compare its reasoning about, imaging 
of, and interacting with reality with 
anything like reality. He called such 
systems autopoietic systems 
(Maturana/Varela 1980). Reality is 
necessarily nothing but an observed 
reality. Maturana’s methodological 
prescript forbids us to use any lan-
guage that would describe adaptative 
achievements of a learning system. Any 
learning interpreted by an external ob-
server as learning about something 
real exists only in the domain of actual 
states of cognition. For Maturana, the 
autopoiesis model was incompatible 
with the conception of a non-living 
technical artificial intelligence, which 
necessarily must start with functional 
concepts concerning the ability to 
learn. Such beings learn, so to say, in 
our world, not in theirs. We can assess 
their mistakes, because we can com-
pare that what they learn with what 
they should learn. And we can re-write 
the program so that they can do better. 
If, according to Maturana, no living 
cognition system can import any in-
formation from the environment, then 
observing the operations of observers 
in a labyrinth (its environment) is only 
possible from a virtual point within 
this labyrinth. Maturana’s thought 
model was influential and contributed 
to the analysis and construction of 
cognition and communication systems 
based on principles of self-
organization. Still, most researchers 
would oppose such purist rigor and ac-
cept the fruitfulness of a functional 
language enabling one to observe evo-
lutionary and adaptive learning. In any 
case, at least Maturana put his finger 
on the unsolved methodological prob-
lems that arise if cognition is partly ob-
served from a causal and autopoietic 
perspective from within the labyrinth, 
and a functional perspective from out-
side the labyrinth. It should be added 
that Maturana’s methodological rigor 
led him into a rather bizarre episte-
mology of recursive observation, which 
no longer informs or attracts empirical 
researchers.   
The purpose of briefly inspecting the 
methodological problems of some re-
search fields that deal with observing 
and learning about people, cultures, 
brains, and artificial systems is to show 
that those of the sociology of scientific 
knowledge are quite ordinary. Before 
turning to this field I propose the gen-
eral observation that in all these disci-
plines there are tendencies to undercut 
the methodological strength imposed 
by the labyrinth thought model. These 
tendencies can have different forms. 
There can be different schools (e.g., 
functionalist versus anti-functionalist, 
nomothetic versus ideographic), or the 
application of different tools (reduc-
tionism, integrative modelling, simula-
tion), or the use of ‘thick descriptions’ 
which take the liberty of switching be-
tween the observation points without 
too much respect for methodological 
barriers. Most research fields tend to 
occupy both places of observation, with 
or without explicit justification. This 
can perhaps be defended with Ein-
stein’s bon mot on the methodological 
opportunism which is characteristic of 
every fruitful research. Still, it is desir-
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able to offer an argument that justifies 
such opportunism in methodological 
terms.  
The strongest claim to restrict the ob-
server’s position to one within the 
labyrinth was articulated by the strong 
programme sketched in David Bloor’s 
“Science and Social Imagery” from 
1976. Bloor claimed that a sociological 
observer must refrain from making the 
truth of any knowledge claim an em-
pirical fact if one wishes to analyse the 
causes of its acceptance in any group, 
culture, or society. His point is that the 
observer must avoid a vicious circle, 
which, of course, is a methodological 
point. When a cultural group (e.g. a 
scientific community) is convinced of 
the truth of a set of beliefs, the causal 
explanation of this fact obviously can-
not refer to the truth of the beliefs. The 
reasons they have for feeling convinced 
must be identified independently of 
the secondary observer’s own judge-
ment concerning the truth or the fal-
sity of the beliefs. Take as an example 
the pre-modern model of geocentric 
astronomy. The reasons and evidences 
that convinced pre-modern astrono-
mers of the truth of the Ptolemaic 
model cannot change based on the sec-
ondary observer’s state of conviction. 
Therefore the sociological explanation 
of false belief cannot differ from that of 
true belief. This is the veil of methodo-
logical ignorance which sociologists of 
science constrain themselves to look 
through.  
This tenet is powerful indeed, even if 
its price is high. Its strength is the un-
mistakably clear positioning of the sec-
ond order observer within the laby-
rinth. Whatever he knows about the 
truth or falsity of a knowledge claim is 
forbidden knowledge within these 
methodological limits. The price to be 
paid is to associate all scientific knowl-
edge completely with any kind of belief 
system. The attempt to explain the 
causes of a belief may lead from indi-
vidual evidence or collective trust into 
authority or social bonds of solidarity. 
However, whether any of these sources 
are reliable cannot be tested by check-
ing the truth-value of the belief. This 
price does not seem too high when the 
sociological observer looks at contem-
porary knowledge in the making. Take 
as an example Harry Collins investiga-
tion into gravitation wave research 
(2004). Even if he tried to be as com-
prehensive as possible he could not 
claim to solve the riddle by comparing 
the actions of his observers with the 
structure of their labyrinth. (Otherwise 
he could well be the first sociologist 
who wins the Nobel Prize in physics by 
deriving new and accepted knowledge 
about gravitation waves by observing 
observers of measuring instruments). 
The situation becomes less comfortable 
if the second order observer is inter-
ested in studying ideologies, betrayal, 
and deceit in science. And his position 
is completely helpless if asked to give 
advice with respect to the question of 
what would make a knowledge claim 
more reliable or trustworthy. A distinc-
tion between good and bad construc-
tions based on knowledge gained by 
comparative studies would not be pos-
sible – given the veil of methodological 
ignorance.  
Critical objections against the strong 
programme have not invalidated its 
methodological strength. Ethnometh-
odologists criticized the simplicity of 
the causality concept (Knorr 1988). In 
fact, a strict model of a law-like rela-
tionship between scientific beliefs as 
effects and social events as causal con-
ditions has never been offered. But the 
methodological directive to look for 
causes that make scientists believe a 
given claim can be stated independent 
of an available theoretical model. The 
most frequently used conditioning fac-
tor has been the concept of “interest” 
which can be associated with social 
background and organizational bonds. 
While the occasional suitability of the 
concept is beyond doubt, it was not 
successfully elaborated toward an ana-
lytical framework (Woolgar 1981). Phi-
losophers of science questioned the self 
applicability of the ‘Strong Pro-
gramme’, even if Bloor announced this 
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as one of its axiomatic points of depar-
tures (Laudan 1980). Additionally, 
massive criticism was raised by Latour 
(1999). The strong programmers’ belief 
in the scientific accessibility of the so-
cial conditioning of beliefs is by no 
means stronger than the natural scien-
tists’ belief in the natural causes mak-
ing these beliefs true–; all points of 
criticism are well made but they do not 
affect the methodological kernel. It 
may well be that the ‘Strong Pro-
gramme’ will never be transformed 
into an empirically founded theory, 
and it appears that no one is interested 
any more in doing so. My attempt has 
not been to defend the ‘Strong Pro-
gramme’, but to emphasize its strength 
with respect to the methodological 
foundations of the social studies of sci-
ence. On its basis, social constructiv-
ism of scientific knowledge means no 
more and no less than this: from the 
point of sociological observation of the 
formation of knowledge-claims, refer-
ence to the truth of these claims is 
methodologically excluded by the veil 
of ignorance, which needs to be ac-
cepted if the sociological observer has 
decided to operate within the laby-
rinth. This minimal statement is con-
sistent with the criticisms mentioned. 
It avoids the considerable philosophi-
cal controversy between realism and 
constructivism yet at the same time 
declares the search for social construc-
tion mechanisms a disciplinary socio-
logical task. 
But why should an observer so strongly 
be restricted by methodological 
boundaries? Before trying to answer I 
want to point at an interesting asym-
metry in the labyrinth thought model 
between the internal and the external 
position of the observers. Any external 
observer possesses the capacity to 
move inside and try to ignore the addi-
tional knowledge about the labyrinth. 
In doing so, he faces problems such as 
the (im-)possibility of unbiased obser-
vation and the translation back into 
the context of his culture. Still there is 
this asymmetry, which virtuously and 
opportunistically is taken advantage of 
in all disciplines which study knowl-
edge production and communication 
in different historical periods, cultures, 
biological species, or even robots. Do 
the methodological binding forces as 
outlined by the ‘Strong Programme’ 
put the sociology of knowledge in an 
exceptional position? Certainly, there 
is no way whatsoever to leave the posi-
tion of a participant observer inside the 
labyrinth if processes of contemporary 
knowledge production are observed 
because the observer cannot be more 
knowledgeable than the observed sci-
entists. But the majority of case studies 
do not completely prevent the secon-
dary observer from knowing some-
thing about the issues that have been 
at stake.   
3 A Sociology of Truth?  
This section will look more closely at 
the causality mechanism relating truth 
claims to social conditions. It was al-
ready the basic idea of Popper’s falsifi-
cationism to circumnavigate the vi-
cious circle implied by using truth as 
cause but nevertheless hold up a nor-
mative stand. If there is no access to 
controlling the truth of a knowledge 
claim, then there are at least possibili-
ties to check their resistance against 
refutations. A knowledge construction 
that proves stable against organized 
sceptical testing cannot be too bad, be 
it true or not. A society that cultivates 
the construction of new knowledge as 
well as procedures to deal with them is 
a culture ready to learn in the double 
sense of being quick and being careful. 
Even Thomas Kuhn approved the fol-
lowing quote from Conjectures and 
Refutation: “Assume that we have de-
liberately made it our task to live in 
this unknown world ... and to explain it 
... with the help of laws and theories ... 
then there is no more rational proce-
dure than the method of conjecture 
and refutation.” (Kuhn “Criticism and 
the Growth of Knowledge” 1972: 22) 
But as is well known, the rationality of 
the model is not sufficiently in line 
with the history of science (recall Laka-
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tos’ nice phrase: “history falsifies falsi-
ficationism”), nor did it survive epis-
temological objections concerning the 
independency of testing from theory. 
Still, Popper’s idea to define an institu-
tional procedure to control and evalu-
ate the quality of a knowledge con-
struction by its capacity to survive 
critical testing was pioneering because 
it handed over to the secondary ob-
server within the labyrinth an instru-
ment of his own. 
I shall not follow Popper’s social epis-
temology of organized criticism, but 
rather take over the notion of indirect 
truth relatedness of second order ob-
servation. My argument is the follow-
ing: Even if it is impossible to intro-
duce truth as a cause, it is possible to 
accept justifications of beliefs as 
causes. ‘Justification’ is taken here as 
comprising all communication about 
the potential evidence related to a 
knowledge claim aiming at its accep-
tance or disapproval. Justifications 
vary from traditional epistemic con-
cepts to more institutional ones such 
as trust in peer review or acknowl-
edgement of licenses. Taken very gen-
erally, justifications can refer to a 
broad variety of instances for the fixa-
tion of beliefs, among which are con-
ventions, habits, norms, fate, author-
ity, or revelation. They all can serve to 
answer the question “why do you be-
lieve p to be true” with a “because …” 
clause. Epistemologically relevant are, 
of course, those justifications which 
claim to ‘refer to truth’. They comprise 
the announcement of having been an 
eye-witness, possession of data and 
documents, presentation of calcula-
tions, or a description of an experi-
mental setting. An indicator of truth-
related justification is openness for 
continuing the communication about 
claims with further “but why …” ques-
tions. But presumably they end rather 
quickly when some basics are touched 
upon. Normally, nobody is prepared to 
answer questions such as “why do you 
rely on the data produced by your in-
strument, on the outcome of a calcula-
tion?” Rational justification also ends 
in or merges with conventions, habits, 
norms, and authority. At least, it seems 
difficult to assume that justifications 
referring to truth form a set of stan-
dards or criteria which are tailored for 
science and distinguish scientific justi-
fication from other forms of belief 
management. But this is not my point. 
The point is that truth related justifica-
tions can be taken by a second order 
observer as an explanans without en-
tering a vicious circle or contesting the 
symmetry principle. Still, one still 
could say that truth cannot play an ex-
planatory role. But by means of justifi-
cations it can play a regulatory role in 
science as well as in the social studies 
of knowledge (Goldman 2001). This is 
important because the correctly stated 
symmetry principle was incorrectly 
used for guiding sociological explana-
tions of truth claims toward all possi-
ble explananda except truth-related 
reasons. Let us imagine a parallel con-
struction of the symmetry principle for 
other areas of society such as political 
power and economic wealth. The ex-
planation of power could be found in 
anything except power; wealth can 
originate in anything than wealth. 
Seemingly, it would be acceptable to 
explain wealth by power and power by 
wealth, just as it is possible to explain 
knowledge by power/authority or by 
wealth/patronage. Consequently, it 
would even be allowed to explain 
knowledge by power, power by wealth 
and wealth by knowledge. The viola-
tion of the vicious circle is only hidden 
in a merry-go-round. 
I have mentioned that one of the criti-
cal objections to the ‘Strong Pro-
gramme’ was directed against its cau-
sality concept. Why should some vari-
ables (e.g. authority, class interests, or 
other features of culture (Bloor 1976: 
3) be accepted as independent, while 
others (in this case instances of evi-
dence) are considered to be depend-
ent? Or more precisely, why, in a soci-
ology of science, should the set of ex-
planatory causes comprise an almost 
unlimited variety of variables such as 
carrier, professional standing, money, 
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religious background, social adher-
ence, but precisely exclude truth—truth 
taken in its sociological meaning as 
justified belief? From an epistemologi-
cal point of view we face the following 
alternative: Either any causal explana-
tion in the social sciences leads into a 
vicious circle based on the careful as-
sumption of equal rights for all vari-
ables with causal explanatory power, 
or the ‘Strong Programme’ must be 
based on an equally strong sociological 
theory that enables it to distinguish 
theoretically between the basic and the 
dependent variables and allows lineal 
causal explanation of empirical find-
ings by reducing the latter to the first.   
Giving ‘equal rights’ to variables which 
can be more or less influential in shap-
ing social change does not imply the 
return to truth as an unconditioned 
and freely accessible criterion. Rather 
it implies taking the institutional ra-
tionality of science as relevant in itself 
– as something that can be explained 
as well as something that can assist in 
explaining something else. In 
Luhmann’s language it means taking 
truth seriously as a medium of society. 
A medium needed for what? “The truth 
medium serves societies blind flight” 
(Luhmann 1998: 252). Blind flight is 
another metaphor for orienting oneself 
in an unknown reality. And, of course, 
the second order observer is on the 
plane. Blind flight depends on numer-
ous technical installations and the 
competences of trained experts. 
Whether or not the flight is successful 
depends on many factors, even per-
haps on advice given by authorities of 
power and money. However, the most 
important share of independent vari-
ables refers to knowledge partly mate-
rialized in technology and partly em-
bodied in competences. According to 
this metaphor, a sociology of truth 
cannot return to an external second 
order position and directly observe the 
fitting of blind flight to reality. How-
ever, it should not recoil from the cir-
cularity structure which persists if the 
acceptance of justified belief in the op-
eration of scientific instruments de-
pends on the acceptance of justified 
beliefs in a theory-based calculation. 
Perhaps the systems theory of 
Luhmann goes too far in giving the in-
stitutional rationality of functional sys-
tems an absolutely closed structure. 
But the important point of the blind 
flight argument is that sociological ex-
planations can correctly refer to truth 
(justified belief) as an independent 
variable or cause. If this leads into a 
circular explanation, then either circu-
larity is unavoidable or explanation is 
impossible. The labyrinth metaphor 
aimed at avoiding the circularity trap 
by fixating the secondary observer ei-
ther inside or outside. We shall see 
how the model needs to modified in 
order to incorporate truth as cause.  
4 The Cultural Relativity of 
Justification 
Adherents to the ‘Strong Programme’ 
may object that the last paragraph 
elaborated the obvious, namely that 
justified beliefs can of course function 
as causes of justified beliefs, provided 
they are restricted by the valid condi-
tions of a given cultural labyrinth. Just 
as some forms of authority or heredity 
are accepted as sources of justification 
in one culture and not in others, per-
sonal evidence may count in one case 
but not in another. The value of a wit-
ness can depend on his social status in 
one culture or on his withstanding 
cross examination in another culture. 
Therefore, the counter argument runs, 
the attempt to include truth claims via 
justifications of beliefs into the set of 
explaining causes ends where it 
started. The forms and values of justi-
fications depend on social institutions, 
of which scientific institutions are just 
a subset. “There are no context-free or 
super-cultural norms of rationality” 
(Barnes/Bloor 1982: 27). Thus, just as 
there are different cultures there are 
different knowledge cultures. For ex-
ample, different knowledge cultures 
must not necessarily be very distant 
(Chinese versus Western science; cul-
tures of wisdom versus cultures of 
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technology); the differences can exist 
between neighbourhoods in the same 
community (mathematical versus ex-
perimental physics; quantitative versus 
qualitative sociology).  
Taking the cultural embeddedness of 
justification modalities for granted, of 
what value could it then be for the sec-
ond order observer to refer to them as 
explanatory causes? First of all, since 
justification is always addressed to an 
audience, it is a completely communi-
cative affair even if embedded in con-
ventional institutions. This is the rea-
son why in the labyrinth thought 
model two primary observers are ac-
tive. The second order observer wit-
nesses communication between actors 
about potential common knowledge. 
He unavoidably becomes part of the 
communicative social structure, 
whereby his role can be more the pas-
sive listener or the active questioner. 
The institutional framework in which 
justification is embedded and specified 
equips the carrier of knowledge with 
possibilities to substantiate the quality 
of his knowledge and make it a validity 
claim. The communicative structure of 
justification has two poles: reasons 
that warrant a claim and reasons that 
warrant acceptance. It is certainly not 
incidental that the institutional frame-
work of this structure was derived from 
the juridical language of the courts. 
Francis Bacon and Immanuel Kant  
touched upon the similarity between 
evidence production in legal and in 
scientific contexts. The analogy is even 
more inviting from a constructivist 
point of view. It goes as follows. (a) In 
a court of law some of the essential 
facts remain hidden forever. (b) Wit-
nesses are instructed to render their 
evidence communicable and make 
their status as witness reliable. They 
thereby transform remembrances of 
experience into information for an au-
dience. The information can intention-
ally or unwillingly be misrepresented 
and misleading. (c) Prosecutors, de-
fenders, and experts present indica-
tions adding trust or distrust into the 
witnesses’ reports. These may include 
checking the credibility and compe-
tence of the personality as well as test-
ing the solidity of information. (d) The 
jury is supposed to draw a commonly 
shared picture of ‘what was the case’ 
on the basis of questionable reports of 
the witnesses, a patchwork of expert 
information, and the strategic interests 
of lawyers. The mismatch possibilities 
are twofold: unwarranted trust as well 
as exaggerated distrust can lead to mis-
judgement.    
The difference between knowledge 
relevant in science and knowledge im-
portant in a court was traditionally 
seen in the reproducibility of scientific 
evidence for sets of almost similar 
events against the interest in court in 
reconstructing the evidence for an in-
dividual event with irreproducible sin-
gular traits. At first glance the depend-
ence on testimony is less dramatic in 
science because mistakes, errors, and 
deceits can be disclosed by testing the 
experimental reproducibility and 
checking the conceptual consistency, 
or by observing inconsistencies in us-
ing knowledge and knowledge-based 
products (e.g., a new instrument, 
medicine). Without playing down the 
significance of replication, there is 
danger to overstate its regulatory rele-
vance. Case studies have provided am-
ple evidence that in many fields of re-
search control by replication is not cul-
tivated so that the ratio between dis-
closed and undisclosed errors as well 
as their lifespan is unknown (see 
Broad/Wade 1992, Weingart  2001: 
292 ff., EWE 2004). Second, the de-
pendency on trust in testimony is even 
higher in science than in the legal sys-
tem. In a court of law the investment in 
trust ends with every case. The wit-
nesses in different lawsuits are usually 
independent of each other. In science 
every piece of knowledge is produced 
in a systematic dependency from pre-
vious and surrounding empirical 
knowledge, theoretical concepts, scien-
tific instruments and methods. Trust in 
information which cannot be checked 
by personal evidence accumulates over 
time. Even if here and there pieces of 
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received and accepted knowledge are 
re-examined it would be futile for 
every researcher to start from scratch. 
The immense web of trust has caused 
Martin Kusch (2002) to talk of ‘com-
munitarian epistemology’ and give 
trust in testimony a centre stage posi-
tion. Trust in testimony does not only 
(and usually not at all) depend on per-
sonal impression, but is based on insti-
tutions which control the risk of trust. 
There is a third reason for being scep-
tical regarding control by replication. 
Several authors have emphasized the 
increasing capacity of science to ad-
dress problems in their specifity, com-
plexity, social and ecological em-
beddedness (Böhme et. al. 1973, 
Novotny 2005; Carrier 2004). The in-
creased solution-power of disciplines 
can become integrated into inter- and 
transdisciplinary projects. The scien-
tific challenges here are quite different 
from the traditional interplay between 
experimental findings, which can be 
generalized, and the application of 
laws, which can be specified. In these 
cases trust becomes even more impor-
tant. It covers not only trust in actors 
who contribute knowledge from other 
disciplines, but in many cases trust of 
lay persons in the ability of scientists to 
model complex real world projects. 
(Groß/Hoffmann-Riem/Krohn 2005). 
If trust in testimony is so essential for 
the working procedures of science and 
especially for the justified belief in sci-
entific information, then the thesis of 
the cultural bonds of scientific ration-
ality can be taken for granted. Even if 
there are science-specific institutions 
of trust – just as there are those of the 
legal system – it does not follow that 
they have a status as independent in-
stitutions of rationality. Just the oppo-
site seems to be the case. Culture de-
pendent institutions of trust in science 
can become a basis for the construc-
tion of culture dependent research 
fields and bodies of knowledge. I shall 
come back to this point later in the pa-
per. 
Summing up the argument: At vari-
ance with the ‘Strong Programme’, I 
suggest that sociologists of scientific 
knowledge should give up the exclu-
sion of truth-related justifications from 
the set of explaining causes in the 
analysis of scientific knowledge claims. 
Of course the advantage of including 
them is to give science the same socie-
tal position as any other institutional 
system of modern society. From this 
point of view a second order observer 
is entitled to analyse the formal struc-
ture and evaluate the quality of justifi-
cations independent of any judgement 
about the truth value – or the ‘real’ 
evidence – associated with truth 
claims. But as I have shown this justifi-
cation is predominantly based on insti-
tutional trust in testimony – and there-
fore culturally bound to relying on the 
validity or rationality of scientific insti-
tutions. This is not far from what prac-
titioners of the sociology of knowledge 
have maintained for a long time. They 
never claimed that justifications do not 
play their cultural roles, but rather that 
their validity is relative to the culture 
in which they are anchored. Whether 
or not the commonly shared back-
ground convictions are taken as causes 
or as effects of more deeply rooted so-
cial structure variables seems to be a 
minor point.  
The next step of my analysis refers di-
rectly to the concept of the cultural 
relativity of validity claims.  
5 The Instability of Cultural 
Relativity  
The concept of cultural relativity has 
an internal instability. It is strong as 
long as it is directed against proposi-
tions of a culturally independent ra-
tionality which would lead to objective 
knowledge. Today we are in the pos-
session of so many philosophies mak-
ing the essential point that there is no 
such thing as unbound rationality or 
rationality in an absolute sense. The 
list includes, for example, the tying up 
of the concept of rule to life forms 
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(Wittgenstein), the insoluble transla-
tion problem between languages 
(Quine), the untenable concept of 
natural kinds (Quine), the theory lade-
ness of  observation (Hanson), the un-
der-determination of theories (Kripke), 
and the interpretative flexibility of all 
classification systems (Barnes/Bloor). 
These concepts join forces against ar-
guments still defending the possibility 
of conceiving rationality as culturally 
independent. If the validity of justifica-
tions is restricted to specific cultures 
then there is no path left to qualify any 
proposition as, in Kantian terminology, 
universally valid. After having made 
the distinction between perceptive 
judgements (which are, of course rela-
tivistic) and causal judgements, Kant 
said:  
Therefore objective validity and neces-
sary universality (for everybody) are 
equivalent terms, and though we do 
not know the object in itself, yet when 
we consider a judgment as universal, 
and also necessary, we understand it to 
have objective validity. (Prolegom-
mena § 19).  
If this is right, then the authors just 
mentioned would hold that these con-
cepts of objective and universal validity 
are not available.  
However, the attempt to turn this 
negative result into a positive state-
ment about the cultural limits of justi-
fication leads to almost equally prob-
lematic difficulties. From a scientific 
point of view, it should be expected 
that these and other authors show 
what relativity means in terms of the 
construction, demarcation, and obser-
vation of the limits set to rationality by 
a given culture. However, a sociological 
theory which coherently and precisely 
specifies the limiting conditions seems 
to be no less available than the episte-
mology of unbound self-contained ra-
tionality. The essential reason I pro-
pose is: Any attempt to determine the 
limiting conditions of a culture pro-
vides already cognitive options for 
transgressing the limits. The argument 
can be analogically applied to the other 
examples of cultural limitations of ob-
jectivity, e.g. translation. From the im-
possibility of a ‘perfect’ translation it 
does not follow that it is impossible to 
distinguish between better or worse 
translations. Instead, the better the 
limiting conditions of both languages 
are known, the fairer can the search for 
an improved translation be guided in-
cluding options for slightly changing 
certain language features. A similar ar-
gument holds for the justification of 
truth claims. From the impossibility of 
defining a universally valid method of 
justification it does not follow that it is 
impossible to distinguish between 
more general and more idiosyncratic 
forms. I develop this argument in two 
steps. 
I first admit the existence of fixed cul-
tural couplings between institutions 
and justifications (or justified trust in 
testimony). The variety of these cou-
plings is great. It comprises all kinds of 
authority, acceptance of special access 
to sources of knowledge by witchcraft, 
sorcery, priesthood, wisdom, as well as 
professional training and expertise. 
Last but not least it also comprises sci-
entific institutions, which vary between 
research fields, disciplines, and the 
natural and social sciences. We call all 
scientific forms of justification rational 
in so far as they are organized by ar-
gumentation and evidence as opposed 
to any other forms of legitimacy. Still 
they are bound to cultures which give 
argumentation and evidence their in-
stitutional effectiveness.  
Second, it is possible that individuals 
or groups discover the institutional 
relativity of arguments and evidence 
that stabilize beliefs. The discovery ei-
ther expands the margins of acceptable 
beliefs or it leads to dogmatisation 
with the consequence of making mem-
bership dependent on the acceptance 
of a belief system. Or it leads to a proc-
ess which Jean Piaget called a ‘decen-
tering’ strategy. Decentering is based 
on a reflexive abstraction concerning 
the binding forces of cultures. It basi-
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cally consists in developing a new 
frame of interpretation that enables 
one to develop an argumentation ac-
ceptable from different points of cul-
tural views. The standard example of 
such processes is the shift from geo-
centric to heliocentric astronomy. It 
was already the philosopher Nicolaus 
Cusanus (1401-1464) who speculated 
in his book De Docta Ignoratia  (On 
Learned Ignorance) on the possibility 
of observing the astronomical world 
from different positions: “Since it oc-
curs to everybody, whether his position 
is on earth, on the sun or a another 
star, that he is positioned on an un-
movable and fixed central point, and 
that everything else is moving, there-
fore this somebody, if he were on the 
sun, the earth, the moon, the mars, etc. 
would form everywhere new poles. The 
fabric of the universe is therefore so, as 
if it had its centre everywhere and its 
periphery nowhere.” (De Docta Igno-
rantia II, 162). Cusanus calls the earth 
a ‘noble star’ among other stars, on 
which there might live other intelligent 
beings. They would have their own 
perspective of the fabric universe, their 
centre, top and bottom. Now we repeat 
the question of the labyrinth: Where 
do we locate the observer of all these 
observers? Simplifying Cusanus’ uni-
verse to our planetary system, there 
would be a geocentric view, a venocen-
tric one, another from Jupiter, Mars, 
etc. These  culturally bound views can-
not all be universally true though every 
one would provide equally good evi-
dence. As a parable of cultural relativ-
ism the episode could end here. The 
moral would be not to believe too 
strongly in your own position from 
which you observe, measure and model 
the world because there may be other 
equally good perspectives but incom-
patible with yours. But then there is 
the Copernicus solution. It implies ask-
ing the question, what, exactly, some-
body from another planet would ob-
serve and believe to be a valid empiri-
cal basis. From this he developed a 
model capable of deriving the appar-
ently contradictory views from one 
single source, that is, a virtual point of 
reference for all points of empirical ob-
servation. This virtual point of refer-
ence Copernicus located at the Sun. It 
would be equally demanding to all 
planetary observers and represent a 
fair solution. Furthermore, it is an at-
tempt to switch observer’s position 
from inside the labyrinth to the out-
side. It is this switch for which Piaget 
has coined the term ‘decentering’. De-
centering denotes the ability to find a 
cognitive point of analysis, in this case 
a geometrical frame of reference, 
which allows one to correlate different 
points of view. Decentering is also invi-
tation to others to share the cognitive 
explanation of the differing views and 
their compatibility. To be sure, in 
terms of epistemology the real progress 
is not in the empirical gains but in the 
intellectual manoeuvre of being willing 
to look for a point of reference that 
reconciles different points of view. In 
the times of Cusanus and Copernicus 
the switch – in Kantian terminology – 
to a more objective and more general 
frame of reference was virtual; the es-
cape from the labyrinth was only imag-
ined. Today, we cannot seriously doubt 
that a re-examination of the heliocen-
tric interpretation of the planetary mo-
tions is in principle possible insofar as 
the second order observer is able to 
observe  from the outside the primary 
observers. But it does not achieve – 
again in Kant’s language – a complete 
objective knowledge warranted by a 
universally valid justification. It is 
merely a move toward a more objective 
view, one potentially valid for people 
with different perspectives. And it is an 
invitation to participate in a more 
flexible framework. It does not start 
with a Kantian a priori construction of 
a transcendental epistemic subject, but 
with a communication between differ-
ent actors, belonging perhaps to differ-
ent cultures. And it says: There is no 
potential stopping rule for an attempt 
to develop a more general, more flexi-
ble frame of reference. At this point a 
second moral can be drawn from the 
Cusanus-Copernicus parable: Every 
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lesson in cultural relativism is a lesson 
in designing a cognitive strategy to 
transcend it. To understand and ex-
plain cultural relativity of knowledge 
implies the ability to work on decenter-
ing frames. The same knowledge that 
makes cultural relativism empirically 
strong weakens it pragmatically. The 
better the social construction of knowl-
edge is understood, especially if ex-
plained in a causal model, the better 
reflexive abstraction opens up possi-
bilities to operate with this causality 
and loosen the closed ties.  
In his essay on “Solidarity or Objectiv-
ity?” (1985), Richard Rorty has posed 
the question of which epistemological 
standpoint should be reduced to the 
other. The realists’ basis is objectivity, 
the relativists’ (he prefers the term 
ethnocentrism) is solidarity. Rorty 
admits that a solidarity basis cannot 
have the rigor of an axiomatic system. 
“Cultures are not so designed, and do 
not have axiomatic structures. To say 
that they have ‘institutionalized norms’ 
is only to say, with Foucault, that 
knowledge is never separable from 
power – that one is likely to suffer if 
one does not hold certain beliefs at cer-
tain times and places. But such institu-
tional backups for beliefs take the form 
of bureaucrats and policeman, not of 
‘criteria of rationality’” (Rorty 1985: 9). 
Nicely said, but it is an ambivalent 
message. Although it emphasizes the 
institutional ties of beliefs, it intro-
duces at the same time the necessity of 
completely different regulatory 
mechanisms in order to suppress and 
erase unacceptable beliefs. If the causal 
determinist model of cultural relativ-
ism were correct, the omnipresence of 
censorship could hardly be explained. 
This is what I have called the inbuilt 
instability of the social construction of 
knowledge. Every understanding of the 
factual coupling is a possibility of dis-
solving it in the direction of a more 
loose coupling. This result applies also 
to the sociological analysis of scientific 
knowledge. Its reconstruction of the 
relativity of knowledge is a potential 
contribution to expand its irrelativity.  
6 From Social to Deliberative 
Constructivism 
In two aspects I wish to go beyond Pia-
get’s evolutionary epistemology. One is 
to emphasize that all decentering 
strategies have their price. The other is 
to understand that strategies to re-
strict, rather than expand, validity 
claims are equally important. By re-
flexive abstraction they become man-
ageable in both directions. In other 
words, the aspects are linked.   
Interestingly, the last twenty-five years 
have witnessed an increasing number 
of programs and paradigms which 
counteract the tendency of making 
claims more general and objective. 
They offer epistemologies which at-
tempt to particularize validity claims 
and institutions of trust. Or they offer 
self-descriptions of cultures which fit 
certain epistemologies. They are not 
guided by a pre-constructive dogma-
tism, but by turning constructivism 
into a tool for manufacturing epistemic 
cultures. Furthermore they do not 
principally criticize abstractive reflec-
tion and decentering processes. How-
ever, they do maintain that every move 
toward a culturally more independent 
justification is a movement in a certain 
direction with gains at the costs of al-
ternative directions. Because decenter-
ing is not unidirectional, there is an 
element of choice involved.   
As an example I take feminist episte-
mology as it is developed by Donna 
Haraway (1995). Her focus is not femi-
nism in particular, but what she calls 
“embodied objectivity and situated 
knowledge”, a concept that is certainly 
opposed to a disembodied objectivity 
as strived for by the Copernican virtual 
observers. Haraway builds her episte-
mology on the concept of vision. Scien-
tific cognition, as it is usually declared 
but not practiced, aims at perceiving 
the world from potentially everywhere 
(universal perceptibility), and in this 
attempt it tries to imitate or simulate 
‘God’s Trick’: to see everything without 
being seen and to see everything from 
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everywhere: omnipresence and om-
nivision. Donna Haraway calls this the 
ideal of masculine science. In another 
chain of arguments she calls it con-
fessed irresponsibility. One is respon-
sible only for insights which depend on 
the point of view one has chosen. Om-
nivision has no point of view. Here is 
her alternative: “Only partial perspec-
tive promises objective vision”. “Per-
spectives are active perceptive systems 
building on ways of life, each with a de-
tailed, active partial way of organizing 
worlds” (Haraway 1995: 181). They un-
avoidably lead to different world views. 
Haraway takes her most important 
epistemological step when she specifies 
what is needed to understand and to 
acknowledge the specificities and dif-
ferences of these views. It is “the loving 
care of people who are ready to learn 
how to perceive the world from a dif-
ferent perspective.”(181) This argu-
ment obviously leads back to a an epis-
temic decentering strategy, though a 
quite different one. It is not guided by 
the rational construction of a cognitive 
system, but by loving care, which I take 
to be something like a sympathetic 
strategy. “To understand how these 
visual systems work – technically, so-
cially, psychically – this should be the 
pathway for embodied feminist objec-
tivity.”(181) Obviously Haraway is 
looking for of a new decentering strat-
egy that allows the feminist perspective 
to exist among several others. And the 
strategy is directly derived from a 
feminist perspective. The new episte-
mological feature is the element of 
choice with respect to decentering op-
tions. Even if scientists are asked to 
give reasons for making choices, they 
remain choices nonetheless. Here are 
Haraway’s reasons: “I am arguing for 
politics and epistemologies of location, 
positioning, and situating, where par-
tiality and not universality is the condi-
tion of being heard to make rational 
knowledge claims.”(186) One can call 
this an argument for a pragmatic rela-
tivism. The irresponsible omniperspec-
tive is no longer accepted, but the rele-
vance of other perspectives which are 
able to present their different value 
bases and embodiments is acknowl-
edged. It should be clear by now how 
completely different the future path of 
the development of scientific knowl-
edge should be constructed according 
to Haraway. The striving for universal 
objectivity should be abandoned in fa-
vour of knotting together values and 
knowledge – toward valuable percep-
tions of the world. The unwillingness 
to present such a perspective is a sign 
of irresponsibility and should give rise 
to scepticism.  
Donna Haraway’s argumentation is far 
from being idiosyncratic. Similar rea-
soning can be found in Richard Rorty. 
In his “Solidarity or Objectivity?” he 
pleads for the primacy of social values 
over truth claims. “To be ethnocentric 
is to divide the human race into the 
people, to whom one must justify one’s 
beliefs, and the others” (Rorty 1985: 
13; 1988: 27). Here it becomes even 
more clear than in the feminist context 
that in every society – and of course 
between different societies – there is a 
manoeuvring space which leaves it 
open to determine the cultural entity to 
which a person wishes to address va-
lidity claims. The quote should not be 
taken to advocate decisionism. The 
context makes it clear that there 
should be talk in society on what kind 
of values, ideals, live forms, and envi-
ronments people wish to base their ra-
tional commitments – science in-
cluded.  
It would be worthwhile to consider fur-
ther challenges to decentering strate-
gies by new forms of centering knowl-
edge to values, experiences, and even 
interests. I only mention in passing the 
deep ecology epistemology and other 
environmentalist approaches which 
aim at a physiocentric positioning of 
epistemology. According to Meyer-
Abich (1997), the conception of univer-
sal justification of objective knowledge 
turns out to be in fact a very anthropo-
centric reading of the world. Meyer-
Abich outlines anthropocentrism as 
the belief in the moral right to under-
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stand the world as something put to 
the disposition of knowledgeable sub-
jects. Within this belief system one 
does not even think to justify knowl-
edge claims and their technological 
derivates by recourse to anything else 
than human beings. In the eyes of 
Meyer-Abich, Michel Serres (1994), 
and Bruno Latour (2001) physiocen-
trism is an alternative path of decen-
tering. Human beings have to under-
stand that their privilege is not a spe-
cial place in the world from which they 
are able to have an objective point of 
view. Their privilege is their responsi-
bility to care for the rights and values 
of the other inhabitants of the world. 
I hope to have sufficiently substanti-
ated the point that loosening the fixed 
couplings between cultures and scien-
tific belief systems does not amount to 
entering a one-way road to more gen-
eral justifications of validity. I return to 
the main argument: The foundation of 
the sociology of knowledge is not solid 
but rather like quicksand, at least in a 
society where sociology of knowledge 
(and its precursors in philosophy) is 
present. To be sure, there are always 
binding forces between social institu-
tions and rational strategies of justifi-
cation. But these forces do not estab-
lish fixed and tight couplings between 
the institutions of trust and the strate-
gies of knowledge. Options toward 
more general as well as more specific 
relations come up and can be realized 
if they are supported.  
The ‘Strong Programme’ departed 
from the search for the institutional 
causes that turn beliefs into accepted 
knowledge. As Francis Bacon stated 
long ago, knowledge of causes gives 
options for action. Certainly the con-
cept of cause in the social domain can-
not be taken in its rigid meaning (as 
necessary and/or sufficient condition 
of effecting something according to a 
time independent causal law). But 
doubtlessly new insights into social 
mechanisms provide new spaces of ac-
tion. It is in this context that construc-
tivism has a future as a frame for de-
liberative forms of knowledge con-
struction and justification.  
The scope and impact of deliberative 
constructivism cannot easily be as-
sessed. Admittedly, there are fields of 
science where profound changes are 
unlikely. But the areas of knowledge 
production are increasing, where 
agenda setting, goal-orientation, prob-
lem solving, and real world experimen-
tation are important. Nowotny, Scott 
and Gibbons (2001) speak of the con-
textualization of science and distin-
guish between weakly and strongly 
contextualized knowledge. They expect 
science to move into the direction of 
increasing contextualization. They in-
troduce the term agora to denote a 
new public space or institutional 
framework in which knowledge pro-
duction is shaped. It is in this contex-
tualization of science where delibera-
tive constructivism will play an impor-
tant role. The keywords feminism, eth-
nocentrism and physiocentrism and 
the ideas of situated, embodied, holis-
tic, contextualized, and robust knowl-
edge indicate how value patterns and 
ideals of knowledge invade the re-
ceived self-description of science. Fur-
thermore, the increasing relevance of 
experts in politics and economics indi-
cate the dissolution of the institutional 
separation of interest and knowledge. 
The increasing impact of agenda set-
ting procedures for many research 
fields indicate the influence of rele-
vance criteria on the flow of research 
money.  
It is in these fields that politics, inter-
ests, and values partake in negotiating 
frames for developing new knowledge. 
These frames determine the institu-
tional conditions of research, partici-
pation, justification, acceptance, and 
use of results. Sceptical scientists cer-
tainly fear a decline and corruption of 
standards, but at this point it is neces-
sary to remember the first lesson of the 
sociology of scientific knowledge. 
There are no such standards which are 
independent of cultural conditions. 
Even more important is another con-
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sideration. Contextualization may well 
go along with rising standards of justi-
fication. Lay people, interest groups, 
political bodies, and firms can behave 
much more sceptically than scientists 
among themselves. It is precisely here 
where decentering validity claims be-
yond the institutional limits of the dis-
ciplinary cultures can be expected. In 
fact, they are already visible. An exam-
ple is the impact of the precautionary 
principle on trial research concerning 
the introduction if genetically modified 
organism in the European community. 
The legislative means regulating the 
treatment of uncertain risks associated 
with new knowledge goes far beyond 
the standards of justification common 
among scientists. Or put in the termi-
nology of trust, contextualized science 
is much more challenged to earn and 
maintain trust. In the opposite direc-
tion, the lowering of justification stan-
dards can be observed as well. An ex-
ample is the advance of non-standard 
medical knowledge and its acceptance 
by concerned patients. Here justifica-
tion of knowledge is restricted to a 
smaller cultural domain. Something 
similar can be observed when experts 
are expected to give advice in complex 
action fields. The span to be bridged 
between science-based knowledge – 
drawing a complete picture of the 
situation – and suggested measures 
may be wide, but the necessity to act 
lowers the standards of justification. 
Related fields are those where research 
and social change merge. A prominent 
example is research on and adaptation 
to climate change. Here the negotiation 
of standards is especially visible be-
cause a board of researchers has made 
it its policy to speak with one voice. 
Cases of less dramatic scope have been 
considered under the name of real 
world experiments. Here the standards 
of validity can come very close to what 
in science is associated with hypotheti-
cal reasoning and recursive learning. 
Confidence does not primarily refer to 
the applied knowledge, but to the sci-
ence based process of getting stepwise 
closer to a satisfying solution. 
The variety of fields where the negotia-
tion of standards of justification and 
the readiness to invest trust in knowl-
edge can be observed is great. It in-
creases the more science penetrates all 
areas of society. In turn, modalities of 
forming specific cultures of knowledge 
and research increase as well.  
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